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1How the U.S. Experience Can Inform the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy
This report seeks to describe the process and pitfalls through the experience of the United States in enacting and 
amending legislation to manage its fisheries resources. Why the U.S. experience? The American legislation, known 
as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), sought to rebuild and then stabilise 
the country’s fishery resources. This experience of devising legislation and negotiating the many stakeholder 
interests—in particular, the adoption of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) as a limit rather than a target—makes it a 
valuable example for the present reform of the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).
The CFP is the European Union’s instrument for managing fisheries and aquaculture within its exclusive economic 
zone and the conduct of its fleet fishing outside EU waters. After a considerable period of negotiation, the CFP 
came into effect in 1983.
In 2007, the European Court of Auditors released a special report on EU fisheries, scathing in its assessment of the 
CFP and serving as the impetus for a fundamental overhaul. The report recognised that the policy had not attained 
its target and had ‘not delivered sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources’. It assessed that ‘the fisheries sector 
is characterised by economic fragility resulting from overinvestment, rapidly rising costs and a shrinking resource 
base: This is reflected in poor profitability and steadily declining employment’.
In 2009, the European Commission launched a reform of the CFP. In its consultation paper, the Commission asserts 
that more than 80 percent of assessed fish stocks in EU waters are deemed overfished and 30 percent are outside 
safe biological limits. Unless the reform succeeds where previous ones failed, fish stocks will be further depleted, 
exacerbating the crises facing the fisheries sector, with potentially disastrous consequences for fishery dependent 
coastal communities in Europe and in developing countries, and for the marine environment. Some scientists have 
even predicted the global collapse of commercial fisheries by about 2050.
one of the principal factors contributing to overfishing has been the ready acquiescence of decision-makers to 
short-term interests by setting total allowable catches (TACs) at levels that lead to overfishing. In the EU, TACs 
are proposed by the European Commission and agreed to by EU fisheries ministers. In the last 10 years, ministers 
agreed on fishing limits, which were on average 48 percent higher than the scientific advice. As a result, many 
scientists fear that a larger number of EU fish stocks will not be able to reach the level of MSY by the internationally 
agreed 2015, even if fishing activities were to stop outright.
The MSA can provide useful lessons on how to manage fisheries more sustainably through more conservative 
targets as well as clearly defined triggers and time frames. While this might entail lower catches in the short-term, it 
provides greater environmental, economic and social benefits in the medium- to long-term.
The debate over this reform of the CFP needs to be informed by appropriate examples and expertise; the Pew 
Environment Group is committed to this and believes the U.S. experience with the MSA is of particular relevance to 
CFP reform, by illustrating what works and what doesn’t.
Foreword
2 Lessons from the United States
Summary
In 1976, the U.S. president signed legislation 
claiming the area and living resources out to 200 
nautical miles from the coast as the country’s 
exclusive economic zone. The legislation, the 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, was 
intended to end foreign fishing in those waters, 
rebuild and then stabilise fishery resources 
and expand U.S. fishing capacity. As a key to 
stabilisation, fishery management was based 
on the concept of maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY), which assumes that the goal is to catch 
the maximum number of each species that could 
be removed on an ongoing basis. Subsequent 
amendments introduced the concept of 
optimum yield, which allowed catches to exceed 
the MSY because of short-term social and 
economic rationales. Then, in a sweeping set of 
amendments titled the Sustainable Fisheries Act 
of 1996, optimum yield was redefined with the 
intent of using MSY as a limit, not a debatable 
target. Those amendments also, crucially, 
introduced quantified definitions of ‘overfishing’ 
and ‘overfished’, created a list of overfished 
species and required that overfished populations 
be rebuilt within 10 years (with certain 
exceptions, mainly for long-lived and large pelagic 
fishes). Unintended loopholes and regulatory 
misinterpretation and guidance compromised 
the intent of the 1996 amendments to end 
overfishing and use MSY as a limit. Additional 
amendments in 2006 sought to close those 
loopholes, requiring an end to overfishing and 
prompt rebuilding. Despite a history of partial 
success, the 1996 amendments helped stabilise 
and prompt the beginning of recovery of many 
U.S. fishery resources. MSY has conceptual 
weaknesses but is not responsible for the 
inadequacy of fishery management. Rather, the 
main problems have stemmed from failures of 
management agencies to implement limits based 
on MSY. In fact, implementing and enforcing 
fishing management measures that use MSY as 
a limit, and allowing fishery resources to rebuild 
to population levels that would support MSY, 
would be a vast improvement in the United 
States and elsewhere. Quantifying definitions, 
triggers and targets is essential to making fishery 
management work. Enforcement is another key.
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foreign trAwler SAiling off u.S. coASt, 1969.
Background: The Fishery Conservation  
And Management Act of 1976
In 1976, the United States enacted the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) to: 
n	 eliminate foreign fleets from U.S. waters, 
n	 restore depleted populations of fish and 
other living marine resources exploited  
in fisheries, 
n	 conserve and maintain viable populations of 
these resources, 
n	 expand U.S. fishing ability.
(In later reauthorisations, the law was renamed 
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act and then the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act [Magnuson-Stevens Act].) 
The FCMA was a direct response by the U.S. 
Congress to the enormous pressure foreign 
fishing fleets were putting on the living resources 
in nearshore waters, especially off the  
Atlantic coast.
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Distant-water fishing in the 1960s and 1970s 
brought the fishing vessels of many countries 
to waters around the world. Depletion of 
fishery resources alarmed U.S. fishermen and 
lawmakers. Legislation was passed to remove 
non-U.S. vessels from the vicinity of the U.S. 
coast and its continental shelves, to boost U.S. 
fishing capacity and to rebuild depleted fishery 
resources, then conserve them. Rebuilding and 
conservation have not succeeded, but changes in 
the law brought those fundamental goals nearer. 
This paper describes the steps in U.S. fishery 
management since the enactment of federal 
fisheries legislation in the 1970s, what has and 
has not worked and why, and what is needed. 
Although the U.S. experience is not without its 
flaws, with this paper, the Pew Environment 
Group hopes to encourage exploration of these 
experiences as an aid to developing solutions 
applicable to the European Union and to 
reforming its Common Fisheries Policy.
4 Lessons from the United States
The fishery management plan is, for 
most practical purposes, the legal fishery 
management instrument.
The act declared a U.S. exclusive economic zone 
extending three to 200 nautical miles from shore 
(waters within three miles are generally under 
the jurisdiction of coastal states). This eventually 
but successfully eliminated foreign fishing 
pressure. The measure also established eight 
regional fishery management councils. Their 
purpose is to bring together fishing interests, 
fishery scientists and managers to devise plans 
for conserving fish populations and regulating 
fishing activity. These fishery management plans 
set guidelines for managing a finfish or shellfish 
stock and serve as the basis for all recovery 
and restoration efforts. Fishery management 
plans are in a sense advisory; they must be 
approved by the federal government. In practice, 
however, the government approves virtually all of 
them. once regulations for implementation are 
approved, the plans become legally binding and 
enforceable. Thus, the fishery management plan 
is, for most practical purposes, the legal fishery 
management instrument.
As soon as foreign fleets began withdrawing 
from waters within 200 nautical miles of its 
coasts, the United States invested heavily in 
building its fishing capacity. Unfortunately, 
this sharp increase in capacity (Safina 1994, 
Rosenberg et al. 2006) added significant pressure 
to already depleted living marine resources. This 
caused further sharp declines in commercially 
targeted populations of fishes and other wildlife 
(Safina 1994). 
In the early 1990s, with many fisheries nearing 
commercial nonviability, managers and Congress 
recognised that little real progress had been 
made in stock restoration. Conservation 
nongovernmental organisations (nGos) began 
to recognise that although fishery councils 
and managers had authority to rebuild fish 
populations, they were not required to do so. 
Short-term economic concerns nearly always 
took precedence over long-term thinking (and 
usually still does), preventing implementation 
of the fishing limits necessary to bring about 
recovery and sustainability. The irony was that 
short-term economic concerns were destroying 
the long-term economic viability of fishing 
communities.
originally, the FCMA enshrined the guiding 
concept that ‘Fisheries shall be managed to 
produce the maximum sustainable yield’. But in 
practice, this often meant restrictions on fishing; 
thus, lobbying pressure from commercial fishing 
interests resulted in amending the language to 
say, ‘Fisheries shall be managed to produce the 
optimum yield, which is maximum sustainable 
yield as modified by social and economic 
considerations’. In principle, it was license for 
fishery managers to ignore scientific findings and 
scientists’ recommendations on limits to catches. 
In practice, managers often set quotas much 
higher than scientists recommended, and the law 
allowed it.
5Some of the major loopholes in the language of 
the 1976 FCMA were corrected with a sweeping 
set of amendments, called the Sustainable 
Fisheries Act (SFA) of 1996. This was the first 
reauthorisation of the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
in which conservation groups were actively 
involved, drafting model legislation and mobilising 
grassroots lobbying. This effort was reflected in 
the results. The legislation was a major overhaul, 
and by adding several new components and 
adjusting key language, it rectified significant 
flaws in the existing law. These additions created 
clearer and more stringent guidelines for fishery 
management plans. 
The first of several significant changes achieved 
with the SFA was a change in the definition of 
optimum. It had been defined as the fishery’s 
MSY, as modified by economic, social or 
ecological factors. The word ‘modified’ was 
changed to ‘reduced’, and the definition now 
reads, in part, that optimum ‘is prescribed as 
such on the basis of the maximum sustainable 
yield from the fishery, as reduced by any 
relevant economic, social, or ecological factor’. 
In principle, MSY is now an upper bound for 
all fisheries. And, in the case of an overfished 
fishery, optimum yield is the amount of fish 
that provides for rebuilding to a level capable of 
producing the MSY. 
The other major improvement in the SFA 
addressed depletion and rebuilding and, 
importantly, did so with quantified triggers. 
It defined overfishing as the ‘rate or level of 
fishing mortality that jeopardizes the capacity of 
a fishery to produce the maximum sustainable 
yield on a continuing basis’. Under the act, 
fishery managers are charged with ending 
overfishing, and they must implement plans 
designed to rebuild stocks within 10 years. In 
most cases, when a population falls below 50 
percent of the estimated biomass (B) needed to 
continually support MSY (BMSY), the population 
is defined as overfished, and it is added to a list 
of overfished species. (The creation of such a 
list was a new requirement of the SFA.) once a 
species is defined as overfished or is projected 
to reach overfished status within two years, 
the regional fishery management council has 
one year to create a plan to recover the stock 
as quickly as possible but within 10 years. 
There are exceptions to the 10-year limit, for 
example, when the biology of the species or 
other environmental conditions dictate a longer 
rebuilding period, as for species such as sturgeon 
and rockfish that are slow-growing and slow 
to mature (Safina et al. 2005, Rosenberg et al. 
2006). Species that are subject to an international 
management agreement but lack a 10-year 
recovery plan are also exempt from the 10-year 
limit. These overfishing prohibitions and recovery 
mandates were new under the SFA. Despite the 
exceptions mentioned above, these provisions 
are the heart of the reforms. 
Ultimately, the 10-year interval was 
selected to balance the economic needs 
of fishing communities with the biology 
of the exploited species.
Ten years was chosen as the rebuilding interval 
for several reasons. First, most overfished stocks 
Steps Toward Improvement:  
The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996
6 Lessons from the United States
could fully rebound within five years if all fishing 
ceased. Doubling this time frame ensured there 
was ample time to implement management 
plans. Ten years was also considered short 
enough to force managers to act, minimizing 
future economic, social and ecological costs 
(Safina et al. 2005). A longer time frame could 
also have been used to justify additional years of 
overfishing or other management failure or delay.
Ultimately, the 10-year interval was selected 
to balance the economic needs of fishing 
communities with the biology of the exploited 
species. If the fishery management council 
fails to provide a plan within one year of the 
stock being declared overfished, the secretary 
of commerce must develop a plan within nine 
months (Rosenberg et al. 2006). The rebuilding 
mandates require managers to create concrete 
plans to allow populations to recover in 
reasonable time to a biomass that can support 
catching the population’s MSY.
other significant accomplishments of the 1996 
SFA included a mandate to minimize bycatch ‘to 
the extent practicable’. It was the first piece of 
legislation to generally require reduction of these 
incidental catches, though the word ‘practicable’ 
weakens the directive. Fishery management 
councils, however, may require bycatch-reduction 
gear within management plans. 
The act also codified the concept of ‘essential 
fish habitat’ and empowered managers to 
designate and protect such habitat. Thus, 
management plans can protect habitat, create 
reserves or no-take zones where spawning fish 
or juveniles live, and defend against development 
that would harm fish and fishery resources 
(Safina 2003). These changes clearly set the 
stage for management that focuses less on one 
species and more on an ecosystem where many 
species live. Still, there has been little significant 
progress in this area (Rosenberg and  
McLeod 2005).
These bycatch and habitat requirements are not 
quantified and thus are vague, poorly defined 
and usually not very effective. Courts have, 
however, handed down strong interpretations 
and decisions regarding bycatch, closing to 
longlining large areas off the southeastern United 
States where juvenile swordfish congregated and 
had suffered high discard mortality. As a result of 
litigation brought by nGos under other statutes, 
such as the national Environmental Policy Act, 
courts also required longliners to use procedures 
designed to minimize bycatch of seabirds  
and turtles.
The SFA also required the secretary of commerce 
to publish, with information provided by the 
national Marine Fisheries Service (nMFS), an 
annual report on the status of all fisheries. These 
reports track progress and identify new stocks 
in need of rebuilding and those that within 
two years will require rebuilding. The SFA also 
required that the ‘best available science’ be used 
in developing management plans and subsequent 
monitoring of progress, helping to ensure that 
plans are objective and scientifically sound 
(Safina 2003, Rosenberg et al. 2006). 
7The 1996 law clearly intended to stop overfishing, 
limit catches to MSY or below, rebuild fishery 
resources and then maintain fished populations 
at the biomass capable of supporting MSY. Catch 
limits for a fish stock (or sometimes a closely 
related group of stocks) must achieve, ‘on a 
continuing basis, the optimum yield from each 
fishery for the United States fishing industry’ 
(SFA). Therefore, the act constrained optimum 
yield (the catch) at or below a stock’s MSY. The 
idea was to keep a stock at a biomass level that 
is sufficiently robust to support the fishery long-
term, without diminishing the resource. 
Stock size will probably fluctuate even when 
appropriately managed. So, after passage of the 
SFA of 1996, nMFS staff members developed 
two major guidelines for estimating the status of 
a stock: the maximum fishing mortality threshold 
and the minimum stock size threshold. These 
concepts, respectively, placed an upper bound on 
fishing mortality and a lower bound on the size of 
a stock. Beyond these thresholds, a stock must 
be declared overfished if it is below the stock 
size threshold, and subject to overfishing if the 
fishing mortality rate is above the upper bound 
(Restrepo et al. 1998). 
The idea was to keep a stock at a 
biomass level that is sufficiently robust 
to support the fishery long-term, 
without diminishing the resource.
The law clearly intended to rebuild the biomass 
that can support MSY and then maintain it. 
Unfortunately, the guidelines drawn up by nMFS 
to implement the law lowered the rebuilding 
threshold considerably and failed to require action 
to maintain stocks at the BMSY target. The thinking 
was, essentially, that because BMSY cannot be 
known with certainty, an ‘envelope’ or range 
suffices, and the lower end of that range  
is adequate. 
The Restrepo et al. guidelines defined 
‘minimum stock size threshold’ thus:
‘The stock size threshold should equal 
… one-half the MSY stock size, or the 
minimum stock size at which rebuilding 
to the MSY level would be expected 
to occur within 10 years. … Should the 
actual size of the stock or stock complex 
in a given year fall below this threshold, 
the stock or stock complex is considered 
overfished’.
This sounds reasonable. But in practice it means 
that, rather than keeping the target at or above 
the biomass that would sustain MSY BMSY, the 
goal of management is to keep biomass above 
just one-half of the BMSY threshold. By failing to 
require the maintenance of BMSY, this technical 
guidance severely undermined the intent of the 
law. This technical guidance was incorporated 
into many fishery management plans and, in 
effect, became law.
A Major Impediment: Guidance That  
Weakened the Act’s 1996 Intent
8 Lessons from the United States
The SFA had advanced the concept that ‘[i]n 
general, Councils should adopt a precautionary 
approach to specification of oY’ (optimum yield). 
Precautionary approaches to estimating optimum 
yield should have resulted in smaller catch quotas 
(especially for fisheries for which inadequate 
data were available). But in practice, fishery 
management councils can adopt one-half of BMSY 
as the minimum size threshold for many stocks.
The SFA was drafted with the clear intent of 
ending overfishing and mandating rebuilding 
of overfished populations within a fixed period. 
The reauthorization of 2006 was in many ways 
an attempt to address loopholes found in the 
1996 legislation. So before considering the 2006 
law, it is worth understanding how the 1996 
legislation performed. Managers, scientists and 
policymakers alike see mixed success.
Rosenberg et al. (2006) extensively reviewed the 
state of U.S. fisheries nearly a decade after the 
SFA became law. By 2005, nMFS had identified 
74 stocks of economic importance in need 
of rebuilding plans. of the 74 stocks, 67 had 
rebuilding plans implemented, and biomass had 
increased in nearly half the stocks. Additionally, 
three—Atlantic sea scallops, Pacific whiting and 
Pacific lingcod—were declared rebuilt to the 
targets specified in their plans (Rosenberg et al. 
2006). A few others—such as Atlantic black sea 
bass, scup and summer and yellowtail flounder—
increased in biomass to the point that it was 
possible to raise the allowed catch (Safina et al. 
2005). 
At the time of the review by Rosenberg et 
al., only 14 percent of the 74 stocks were 
no longer considered overfished. one of the 
biggest pitfalls was continued overfishing in 
Effectiveness of the Sustainable  
Fisheries Act of 1996
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9Reauthorization and Changes in 2006
45 percent of the stocks, sometimes as much 
as five years into the 10-year rebuilding plans. 
This overfishing was challenged, but a court 
ruled—rather nonsensically—that the statute 
allowed overfishing to continue during the 
rebuilding period, as long as the act’s rebuilding 
requirements were met by the end of the period. 
Continued overfishing has hindered progress 
toward recovery and caused further decline in the 
biomass of some stocks (Rosenberg et al. 2006). 
overall, a combination of legislative loopholes 
and mismanagement have hindered much of the 
progress that Congress had intended with the 
legislation (Safina 2003, Safina and Chasis 2004, 
Rosenberg 2007).
Significantly, north Atlantic swordfish are now 
classified as rebuilt—the only large pelagic fish in 
the world whose population is bigger now than a 
decade ago. The areas closed in the southeastern 
United States to protect undersized juveniles 
from bycatch mortality likely played a significant 
role in the swordfish rebuilding. Those areas 
were closed because the 1996 law mandated 
that bycatch be reduced to the extent practicable, 
and conservation groups successfully sued the 
government, claiming that nMFS could reduce 
swordfish bycatch by closing areas where fishing 
boats were discarding high numbers of dead 
juveniles smaller than the legal minimum size. 
In 2006, Congress passed an additional 
reauthorization act, the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management 
Reauthorization Act. This measure authorized 
funding through 2013 and requires the fishery 
management councils to:
n	 establish annual catch limits that prevent 
overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, 
n	 establish annual catch limits that end 
overfishing by 2010 for all stocks 
experiencing overfishing, and by 2011 for all 
other stocks, 
n	 keep annual catch limits lower than the 
limits recommended by their scientific and 
statistical committees.
Further, one of the biggest conservation steps 
taken was revision of the rebuilding provisions 
to make clear that overfishing must be halted 
immediately once rebuilding plans are in place. 
This effectively overturned the earlier court 
ruling that allowed overfishing to continue during 
rebuilding periods. 
It remains to be seen whether the 2006 
reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
will finally end overfishing in U.S. ocean waters. 
These amendments hold much promise, 
but effective implementation must yet be 
accomplished. nMFS guidelines contain a 
loophole that allows managers to set target 
‘annual catch limits’ equal to the level that 
triggers the definition of overfishing, rather  
than requiring, in all circumstances, an  
adequate buffer to account for scientific and 
management uncertainty.
10 Lessons from the United States
Despite limited success, the rebuilding mandates 
have created several positive outcomes. 
Although only a few of the stocks in need of 
strict management have been fully restored 
to levels that can support MSY, biomass is 
increasing in nearly 50 percent of stocks. Several 
federally managed species are supporting 
increasingly stable and sustainable fisheries 
(Rosenberg et al. 2006, Worm et al. 2009). And 
slowly but surely, the amended Magnuson-
Stevens Act has incorporated language referring 
to multispecies fisheries and the habitat and 
ecosystem impacts of fishing. But real-world 
progress on these issues has been minimal 
(Rosenberg 2007, Safina 2009).
Fishery data are gained primarily from landings 
reported by fishing fleets and secondarily 
through scientific surveys. one result has been 
the accumulation of large data sets of fishery 
and ecosystem trends, often spanning decades 
(Prager and Rosenberg 2008, Worm et al. 2009). 
The availability of these rich data sets has 
facilitated interpretation of trends and responses 
in wild stocks. However, major data gaps remain, 
hampering scientists’ ability to assess the status 
of a majority of the populations being fished. The 
phrase ‘best available science’ in the law has 
guided the development of more comprehensive 
and statistically sound data collection and 
analysis tools (Sullivan et al. 2006). It dictates the 
need for comprehensive peer review of analytical 
tools used to develop fishery management 
plans, as well as any new tools. Extensive peer 
review and the use of multiple tools to analyze 
a stock’s status have also made it easier to 
implement appropriate measures at times when 
such measures are strongly opposed by fishing 
communities (Prager and Rosenberg 2008). The 
review process is strengthened by panels of 
internationally recognized fishery experts, not 
involved with the particular stock assessment 
or the fishery itself, who apply innovative tools 
as they become available. The required use 
of best fishery management tools has helped 
ensure that fishery data can be better analyzed 
and interpreted (Bundy et al. 2008). Thus, fishery 
management plans can often be based on sound 
estimates of biomass, which is essential to 
estimating how a stock is likely to respond to 
management actions.
The United States has made significant progress 
in legislation and management. However, 
weaknesses remain from which we can learn to 
design better policy. 
Benefits Gained by Improving  
U.S. Legislation
double-rigged ShrimP trAwler off 
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P
h
o
to
: 
n
o
A
A
11
Points for Improvement and Going Forward
1. The 1996 amendments’ greatest flaw 
was their failure to mandate that fishery 
management plans immediately end 
overfishing upon their implementation. 
Rosenberg et al. (2006) emphasized that 
overfishing often continued more than five 
years into the 10-year rebuilding period, 
greatly limiting the chances of a plan’s 
success. Strong pressure from commercial 
interests to maintain high catch quotas 
often resulted in little or no progress 
within the 10-year plan. However, the 2006 
amendments may go a long way toward 
improving the success of management 
plans—if the two-year limit on overfishing 
is not exceeded.
2. Managers, fearing severe economic 
consequences and lawsuits, often 
do not apply effective restrictions 
(Safina 2003). Despite the best efforts of 
scientists and policymakers to weigh the 
future conservation and socioeconomic 
benefits of fishing restrictions, short-term 
economic concerns in fishing communities 
drive the failure of some management 
plans. Additionally, delays are common 
in the creation of management and 
rebuilding plans. Managers and agencies 
that miss the two-year deadline for the 
creation of a fishery management plan 
are not subject to fines, budget cuts or 
any other penalty. Fishery management 
plans under development are subject to a 
public comment period, opening the door 
to contentious arguing among groups 
with conflicting objectives. Although 
stakeholder input is generally desirable 
as a way to hold managers accountable, 
public disagreement about how to proceed 
can delay progress for several years. 
Fishery managers’ inaction from the mid- 
1970s through the 1990s resulted in a 
resounding lack of progress in rebuilding 
or stabilizing stocks. For example, the 
new England groundfish industry was in 
a state of sharp decline in the 1980s and 
’90s. Despite enactment of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act nearly two decades earlier, 
lax regulation from loose interpretation of 
the Act resulted in the commercial near-
extinction of such species as cod, haddock 
and Atlantic halibut (Safina 1994). 
3. The 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act 
introduced definitions, triggers and 
constraints that were quantified. 
Therefore, councils were required to 
develop fishery management plans 
within one year of a stock being declared 
overfished, to implement these plans 
promptly and to meet the 10-year recovery 
time limit. The actions of these councils 
are under the scrutiny of the secretary of 
commerce as fishery management plans 
are reviewed biennially to see whether 
revisions are necessary (Rosenberg et 
al. 2006). However, managers often 
allowed overfishing to continue under 
these rebuilding plans and failed to allow 
a majority of stocks to recover to levels 
that could support MSY. In 2006, Congress 
mandated that within two years of a 
stock’s being declared overfished, councils 
must adopt a fishery management plan, 
plan amendment or proposed regulation 
that would immediately end overfishing. 
In addition, the 2006 Magnuson-Stevens 
Act reauthorization required that fishery 
management plans include a mechanism 
12 Lessons from the United States
for specifying annual catch limits so that 
overfishing will not occur. This requirement 
goes into effect in fishing year 2010 for 
fisheries declared subject to overfishing, 
and in fishing year 2011 for all  
other fisheries.
4. Too often, catch levels have been set 
at the overfishing level, thus failing 
to properly account for scientific 
and management uncertainty. As 
a consequence, actual catches have 
frequently exceeded authorized catch 
levels with the result that overfishing 
occurs. To meet the new requirements, 
catch levels will almost always need 
to be set below the overfishing level 
to reflect scientific and management 
uncertainty. The 2006 amendments also 
call for accountability measures to ensure 
that catch limits are not exceeded, and 
imposes consequences if they are. It is 
also important to quantify a mandatory 
probability of success in meeting the 
rebuilding schedule for overfished species. 
This point was overlooked in the 1996 SFA.
A federal court decided that plans 
must provide at least a 50 percent 
probability of success in meeting the 
target fishing mortality rate.
 Managers and lobbyists soon found 
that this loophole allowed them to fulfill 
the letter of the law whilst violating 
the rationale of mandated recovery. 
Consequently the first ‘recovery plan’ (for 
summer flounder) set catches at levels 
that had only an 18 percent chance of 
meeting the fishing mortality level set 
under the rebuilding plan. Litigation was 
necessary to close that loophole. A federal 
court decided that plans must provide at 
least a 50 percent probability of success in 
meeting the target fishing mortality rate. 
The court decision could have gone the 
other way, fundamentally undermining 
the legislation’s entire rebuilding mandate. 
But in reality, an 80 percent or higher 
probability is closer to what is really 
needed to ensure that rebuilding occurs 
and is timely.
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5. Although the review process under 
the direction of fishery management 
councils is considered one of the 
greatest strengths of the Magnuson-
Stevens and Sustainable Fisheries 
acts, several weaknesses remain. 
The debate between opposing groups, 
and even among the scientists making 
recommendations based on the same 
fishery data, can be heated, time-
consuming and costly. no changes to 
fishery quotas are made during this review 
process. The rebuilding mandate of 1996 
states that all fishery management plans 
must be created within a year of a fishery 
being declared overfished, but often a 
full year is needed to draft a plan, and 
additional time is needed to implement 
regulations (Rosenberg et al. 2006, 
Rosenberg 2007). Consequently, Congress 
lengthened the time for the council review 
process to two years.
6. Currently, management plans are 
adopted in a linear process. Councils 
propose the plans to the secretary of 
commerce for review. The secretary can 
partially approve a plan and send it back for 
revisions. But revisions could take years, 
leaving no plan (or an inadequate one) 
in place. In practice, then, the secretary 
must choose between accepting the 
management plan at hand or no plan at all. 
There is little room for discussion at this 
point, which is why faulty plans are often 
approved (Rosenberg et al. 2006). 
7. Every two years, the secretary of 
commerce must review the progress of 
fishery management plans, a process 
that is inefficient at best. The plans 
for fisheries that show no rebuilding can 
be revised, but doing so can reset the 
10-year rebuilding time frame—a major 
incentive to create inadequate plans as a 
delaying tactic. Revised plans are often 
fashioned around stocks whose biomass 
has fallen even lower than it was when 
the original plan was drafted. Fishery 
management plans are also reviewed by 
courts when a lawsuit is filed, but only to 
ensure that the plans are meeting legal 
obligations. Increases or declines in stock 
abundance—in other words, whether the 
plan is working—are rarely factored into 
this type of review (Prager and Rosenberg 
2008). The opinions of independent fishery 
experts such as those used in reviewing 
fishery management plans are almost 
entirely absent from the latter stages of 
U.S. fisheries management. The emphasis 
should be on expert review of whether the 
plan is working and if it is not, revising it  
to work.
Current legislation lacks guidance on 
considering predator-prey dynamics or 
ecosystem resilience.
8. A major weakness of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act is its focus on managing 
single stocks in isolation. Many 
scientists now see this as a fundamental 
conceptual flaw in fisheries management. 
They advocate management within 
an ecosystem of many species, their 
relationships and their habitats. The current 
emphasis on managing fish to support 
MSY focuses on how much we can 
remove, rather than how much we should 
leave, and how other species might be 
affected (Safina 2009). Current legislation 
lacks guidance on considering predator-
14 Lessons from the United States
prey dynamics or ecosystem resilience, 
and gives only weak consideration to 
habitat alteration caused by fishing gear or 
changing environmental factors (Hildreth 
2008, Safina 2009). on a positive note, 
several species with similar life histories 
are sometimes managed within a single 
fishery management plan, bringing 
managers closer to considering species 
within their ecosystem. Additionally, 
several states have developed marine 
protected areas, which can be a very 
successful form of ecosystem-based 
management (EBM) (Worm et al. 2009). 
on the other hand, although there is wide 
consensus that fisheries management 
must move to ecosystem-level concepts, 
scientists have yet to articulate a clear 
vision of that kind of management. 
Certainly this is a frontier for  
fisheries management.
9. Because fisheries managers interpreted 
the rebuilding mandate in the 1996 
amendments in a way that allowed 
for lax initial restrictions, much time 
elapsed with little apparent rebuilding. 
The success of a fishery management plan 
relies on the speed with which overfishing 
ceases (Rosenberg 2007, Worm et al. 
2009). Thus, it is imperative that ending 
overfishing become a main objective of 
all fisheries management. Consequently, 
many scientists called for a federal 
mandate to immediately end overfishing 
of stocks declared overfished (Safina 
2003, Rosenberg et al. 2006, Rosenberg 
2007). As previously noted, Congress took 
until 2006 to require that overfishing be 
ended immediately under a rebuilding plan. 
Moreover, the 2006 Magnuson-Stevens 
Act reauthorization requires annual catch 
limits that end overfishing in fishing 
year 2010 for all fisheries experiencing 
overfishing, and in fishing year 2011 for 
all other fisheries. Rebuilding plans should 
also be kept to time frames shorter than 
10 years, where possible. This reduces 
the chances of further overfishing and is 
economically more beneficial to fishing 
communities in the long run than allowing 
further overfishing (Rosenberg et al. 2006).
10. Some have suggested that to 
immediately end overfishing for stocks 
not currently covered under a fishery 
plan, fishery managers should develop 
a default management plan. Under 
such a plan, fishing would probably be 
reduced until enough data were gathered 
to appropriately analyze the status of 
the stock. This would halt or slow the 
decline in biomass, contributing to the 
effectiveness of plans subsequently 
implemented (Rosenberg et al. 2006, 
Worm et al. 2009).
11. Moving from single-species 
management toward EBM requires 
considering species as part of food 
webs in a complex ecosystem, with 
humans as integral players (Leslie et al. 
2008). Managers, however, rarely consider 
ecosystem services (Rosenberg and 
McLeod 2005). It may be possible to work 
toward EBM by implementing small-scale 
ecosystem approaches to management. 
These could include protected habitats 
or closed areas, spatially defined fishery 
management areas and mixed zoning, and 
considering incidental catches within the 
framework of management goals (Young 
et al. 2007, Safina et al. 2009). 
 Application of EBM is currently outside the 
competence of the fishery management 
councils. It could require major interagency 
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cooperation and planning. Apart from 
reviewing a council’s single-stock 
assessments, involvement of outside 
experts and agencies could help develop 
EBM approaches, turning fisheries 
assessment into an interdisciplinary 
science and relieving some of this burden 
from policymaking agencies (Rosenberg 
and McLeod 2005). This could go a long 
way toward improving the social and 
ethical consequences of fishing and better 
equip managers with the skills to integrate 
ocean management in the future (Bundy 
et al. 2008). However, making the process 
more complicated is an unlikely route to 
success. Alternatively, the development of 
an entirely new agency with responsibility 
for EBM goals may be the key to EBM’s 
successful implementation (Rosenberg 
and McLeod 2005, Leslie 2005, Young et 
al. 2007, Bundy et al. 2008, Hildreth 2008).
12. The evaluation of fishery management 
plans often focuses on process rather 
than progress (Rosenberg et al. 2006; 
Prager and Rosenberg 2008). Ensuring 
incremental progress is essential to 
avoiding the kind of large setbacks that 
some stocks have undergone since 1996, 
and reviews should also be used to  
build a database of effective and 
ineffective approaches. 
13. Fisheries managers would increase the 
likelihood of success if they adopted a 
suite of tools and tailored them toward 
particular fisheries or ecosystems. 
Multiple management techniques have 
helped increase fish biomass in a few 
areas in the United States (Worm et 
al. 2009). Subsidy reform could help 
decrease the pressure on some fisheries 
and alleviate financial hardship when 
strict catch quota restrictions must be 
implemented quickly (Safina 2009). In 
P
h
o
to
: 
Je
ff
 R
ot
m
an
drAgger/trAwler crew SortS cAtch of cod, blAcKbAcK (winter) flounder And lobSter neAr glouceSter, mASS.
16 Lessons from the United States
15. Ever since the sweeping reforms of the 
SFA of 1996 and subsequent reforms in 
2006, the failure to rebuild stocks has 
largely resulted from interpretations 
of the legal language that favor the 
short-term demands of commercial 
fishing interests. Future success will 
depend on effective implementation of the 
relatively recent mandate to promptly end 
overfishing, including requirements that 
catch limits be:
n	 based on the science and define MSY 
and BMSY as strict limits, 
n	 set below the overfishing level to 
account for uncertainty, 
n	 enforced.
 The United States has considerably 
improved the way scientists and managers 
collect, analyze and interpret data. U.S. 
fisheries have become a better example 
of applied science (Rosenberg 2007). 
Through major shifts in the thinking of 
fishery managers, we may see the small 
successes of the past evolve into great 
advances in the recovery of our living 
marine resources. The United States 
has learned many lessons and made 
many instructive mistakes on its road 
to improvement. Learning from these 
mistakes can prevent other nations from 
repeating them.
addition, programmes that help consumers 
shift their demand from unsustainable 
fisheries to those that are better managed 
could relieve fishing pressure  
(Safina 2003).
14. Management plans have been slow 
to incorporate new findings on the 
deleterious evolutionary effects of 
overfishing. Considering evolutionary 
forces helps more accurately estimate 
a population’s reproductive and growth 
capacities, which probably decline under 
intensive fishing pressure (Conover and 
Munch 2002). The rapidly increasing 
body of literature on using aquaculture to 
enhance stocks should also be considered. 
If done poorly, as it often has been, 
aquaculture can worsen problems. If done 
wisely, it may be an important component 
of restoration in certain severely depleted 
species, depending on the particulars 
of the case (Safina 2009). Some of 
these concepts are more applicable to 
an ecosystem-based approach; others 
can readily be applied to single-stock 
assessment. It will be important to  
develop ways of including them in 
management plans.
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